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Introduction
One of the most striking and consistent features of financial crisis has been the considerable inflationary pressure that plagued the effected nations (Darrat (1985) ). In this respect, the financial crisis of 1997 in East Asia is no exception. The five most crisiseffected economies of East Asia (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) experienced a rise in their domestic general price levels (Figure 1 ). During the peak of the crisis in 1998, these economies have seen their annual inflation rates to rise by at least four to six percentage points from their average rates in 1996, with the exception of the Philippines and Indonesia.
---Insert Figure 1---
The magnitude of the rise in Inflation in Indonesia however was among the sharpest that the East Asian economies has ever witnessed in the recent decades.
During the height of the crisis in 1998, the average annual inflation rate in Indonesia was around 58 percent, with its highest rate of close to 80 percent. After falling to a relatively low rate in early 2000, inflation rate has increased significantly in late 2000 and hovered between 12-15 percent rate in late 2001. In comparison to the chronic or acute inflation rate of many Latin American countries, the inflation rate in Indonesia during the post-1997 financial crisis is relatively moderate. However for a country that has been committed to and successfully kept its annual inflation rate at a single digit, the 1998 price increase was in fact the worst inflation that Indonesia had experienced in nearly 30 years. 1 In a recent report, the government of Indonesia and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have underlined the instability of rupiah and the overall increasing in uncertainties in the foreign exchange market among the root causes of the strong 1 In fact, from 1990 to 1996, the monetary authority of Indonesia had successfully managed to keep inflation at an annual average of less than 9 percent. inflationary pressures during the last few years (IMF (2002) ). Reflecting the significant rise in uncertainties in the foreign exchange market, the spread between the buying and the selling rate of the rupiah exchange rate against the US dollar widened from less than Rp.100 during the first few months of 1997 to more than Rp1500 on February 1998 (Figure 2) . Accordingly, among the cornerstones of monetary policy agreed between IMF and the government of Indonesia, particularly since the second IMF Letter of Intents (LOIs) signed on January 15, 1998, were to stabilize the exchange rate and to contain the inflationary impact of the large depreciation of rupiah against the US dollar (Soesastro and Basri, 1998, pp.40 ).
---(Insert Figure 2)---
The other cornerstone of the Letter of Intents between IMF and the government of Indonesia is monetary control. The agreement stipulates the limits on broad money (M2) growth, to be achieved through controlling base money (M0) quarterly growths. In late 1997 and early 1998, Indonesia had experienced a rapid growth in the base money due to the liquidity supports provided to troubled banks and the impact of depositor runs on banks (Figure 4 ). In its third agreement with the IMF signed on March 1998, the government of Indonesia acknowledged the necessary tight monetary policy to reduce inflationary pressures in the economy (Johnson, 1998 ).
---(Insert Figure 3 and 4)---
Amid sustained overshooting of the central bank's targets for base money growth and volatile rupiah until late 2001, the effectiveness of the monetary policy has continued to be on the center of debates among the academics, policy makers and members of parliament in the country (Siregar (2001)) . IMF(2002) shows that the level of base money and the inflation rate in December 2001 was about 5.1 percent and 4.7 percent higher than its target set in April 2001, respectively. Looking at Figure 4 , the evidences clearly indicate that inflation has indeed reflected closely the growth rates of base money since early 1998. 2 The acceleration in the inflation rate emerged only within few months after the expansion of base money. We can also trace close co-movements between inflation and the fluctuations of rupiah, albeit not as strongly as between inflation and money supply. It is interesting to note however that there were hardly any traceable co-movements between these key monetary variables during the pre-crisis period ( Figure 3 ).
Given the evidences presented in Figure 4 , the monetarist approach to investigate the sources of inflation in Indonesia will be adopted in this paper. Among the alternative hypotheses of the sources of inflation, the monetary model has perhaps received the most attention, particularly since early 1980s. Lim (1987) , McNelis (1987) and Marrison (1987) have found bilateral exchange rates, which have been devalued occasionally, as one of the determinants of inflation in the Philippines, Latin American countries and Portugal, respectively. 3 Similarly, Calvo et al. (1995) find that the policy of real exchange rate targeting has led to some combinations of persistently high inflation and domestic interest rates in Brazil, Chile and Columbia. Another recent studies that have confirmed the similar conclusions are Bahmani-Oskooee and Malixi (1992) and Alba and Papell (1998) . In addition to the exchange rate factor, most of the studies discussed above also find (domestic and foreign) interest rate and money supply as the other two key monetary factors that have contributed significantly to the inflationary pressure.
With the exception of Rana and Dowling (1985) , a limited number of empirical investigations have however been done to investigate the roles of monetary variables in explaining the inflation rate in Indonesia. Adopting the model developed by Calvo et al. (1995) , Siregar (1999) confirmed the inflationary consequence of the exchange rate regime adopted in Indonesia, but only for the period from January 1990 to July 1995.
McLeod (1997), on the other hand, elaborated the adverse consequences of base money on the domestic price level in Indonesia during the pre-crisis period (up to 1995).
As for the analysis on the post-1997 financial crisis, we come to know only few studies. McLeod (2001) With the objective to further understand the sources of the recent strong inflationary pressures in Indonesia, the aim of our paper is to extend the works of the previous studies in a number of ways. Firstly, given our monthly and quarterly observation sets from 1987 to 2001, we aim to compare and contrast the sources of inflation rate during the pre-and post-crisis period. Ramakrishnan and Vamvakidis (2002) acknowledge that the post-crisis is the most relevant for understanding inflation process in Indonesia under the floating exchange rate regime. Yet, given their quarterly observations, they do not have enough degrees of freedom to break the observations into the pre-and post-crisis sets. We deal with this problem by constructing both quarterly and monthly sample sets. Our study comes to two contrasting conclusions on the sources of inflation during the pre-and post-crisis. These outcomes are critical for the policy making process in the country. the exchange rate policy regimes adopted in the country on the domestic inflation.
As will be shown in this study, the soft-US dollar pegged policy adopted during the pre-1997 financial crisis period in most crisis-effected economies in East Asia, including Indonesia, had successfully managed a stable local currency against the US dollar ( McKinnon (2000 McKinnon ( , 2001 and ). However, it is not without any cost. In this study, we find that the volatility rates of nominal exchange rate of rupiah against yen and against a basket of seven world major currencies were significantly higher than the volatility of rupiah against the US dollar. (Abel and Bernanke (2001) , Deme and Fayissa (1995) and Darrat and Arize (1990) ).
All variables are in the logarithmic forms. ∆ denotes the first difference operation, and t captures time.
The basic real money demand function can be expressed as the following:
That is real money demand is a function of income ( t y ) and prevailing domestic interest rate ( t r ). 5 An increase in income should also increase the demand for money. In 5 For a good review of money demand, please refer to Chapter 3 of McCallum(1989). contrast, a rise in domestic interest rate, or a higher opportunity cost of holding money, will reduce the demand for money.
However recent studies have shown that in an open and financially liberalized economy, such as most of the East Asian economies including Indonesia, the impacts of external factors in the demand for money are found to be significant (Khalid (1999 ), IMF (2002 and Sriram (2001) ). To incorporate the external factors, we adopt a modified real money demand of Khalid (1999) . Equation (4) suggests that the level of domestic inflation is going to be influenced by the level of domestic income, domestic and foreign interest rate, expected depreciation of the local currency (the exchange rate factor) and domestic money supply.
The following first order conditions should hold. Given no other changes, a rise in ) ( t ed lowers money demand. Therefore, there will be a relatively higher supply of money than demand for money in the domestic economy.
Inflation is therefore expected to rise (Equation 1).
As stated, a rise in foreign interest rate ) ( t rf will lower demand for money in domestic economy, as the opportunity cost of holding money increases. Given everything else in the economy remains unchanged, price level is expected to rise.
The rise in output / income should increase demand for money (Equation 2).
Given money supply remains unchanged, the rise in the level of money demand relative to money supply will lead to a decline in inflation rate (Equation 1). Hence, a rise in output will eventually cause inflation rate to decline.
A rise in the domestic interest rate will increase the opportunity of holding money, hence demand for money should fall (Equation 2). With the supply of money unchanged, the fall in money demand should increase domestic inflation (Equation 1).
Lastly, as clearly indicated by Equation 1, an increase in money supply, given everything else remains unchanged, should lead to a higher domestic inflation.
Data and Empirical Testing

Data
Variable ed represents the expected depreciation of rupiah against the US dollar and the Japanese yen, and the nominal effective exchange rate. ed at time (t) The CPI series is sourced from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
Unit Root Testing
It is well known that the data generating process for most macroeconomic time series are characterised by unit roots, which puts the use of standard econometric methods under question. Therefore, it is important to analyse the time series properties of the data in order to avoid the spurious results. To ensure the robustness of the test results, three most commonly used unit-root tests are applied here, namely the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and KPSS unit root tests on the relevant variables. The test for integration based on the ADF test involves formulating the ADF regression (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) .
where t is the time trend. The lag length p is selected to ensure that the residuals are white noise. In essence, the test of whether the variable z t is non-stationary is equivalent to the test of the significance of ρ, i.e., H 0 : ρ=0, in equation (10). Alternatively, Phillips and Perron (1988) proposed a nonparametric method of controlling for higher-order serial correlation in the series. The test regression for the PP (Phillips and Perron) test is the AR(1) process:
While the ADF test corrects for higher order serial correlation by adding lagged differenced terms on the right hand side of equation (11), the PP test makes the correction to the t-statistic of the ρ coefficient from the AR(1) regression to account for the serial correlation. As opposed to both ADF and PP tests for which the test statistic is constructed under the null hypothesis that the series is non-stationary, Kwiatkowski, et al., 1992 (KPSS) r is treated as fixed and it serves the role of an intercept. The stationary hypothesis is that the variance of the residuals in the random walk component ( t u ) is zero. These three tests make a good combination, as the null hypothesis in one test is the alternative hypothesis in the other one.
The unit root test results on the log-forms of the relevant variables are reported in Table 1 . Note here, given the availability of the data series, we test output ) ( y variable based on quarterly observations. As for the rest of the variables, we apply the monthly series. We break the monthly observation set into pre-and post-crisis periods. By adopting this step, we avoid structural breaks on the series associated with the transition from the pre-to post-crisis period. For the quarterly data, we focus only on the pre-crisis.
The use of monthly or quarterly series should not affect the final outcomes of the tests (Pierse and Snell (1995) , and Marcellino (1999) ).
The results reveal that the variables such as rate of inflation ) ( p ∆ , and the expected depreciation of the local currency ) (ed do not contain unit roots and thus stationary processes. But output ) ( y , domestic interest rate ) (r , foreign interest rate ) (rf and the money supply (m0) are found to be an I(1) series (non-stationary processes at the level and stationary processes at the first difference).
----(Insert Table 1) ----
Short Run Dynamics
The main focus of this study is to analyze the role of various macroeconomic policies on inflation rate. Given the unit-root test results, it is irrelevant to examine the long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables, as the dependent variable is stationary. The Autoregressive Distributed lag model (ARDL) has been constructed by treating inflation as an endogenous variable. The non-stationary explanatory variables are differenced appropriately to remove the unit roots. Hence our working model, based on the unit-root test results, will be as follows. . The model for the post-crisis period is based on monthly data as the use of quarterly data for the post-crisis period highly suffers from the lack of degrees of freedom. Furthermore, since the output variable is not available in the monthly frequencies we omit them from the post-crisis analysis. 
----(Insert Table 2-4) ----
Several key findings warrant further analysis. For the pre-crisis period, we do not find any of the interest rate variables contributes significantly to the changes in the domestic price level. Furthermore, while only the quarterly tests show that expected depreciation of rupiah significantly determines the inflation rate, both the quarterly and the monthly regressions confirm the important contribution of the money supply in 9 The pre-crisis covers the period of quarter 1, 1987 to quarter 2, 1997, or January 1987 -December 1996. Availability of data dictates our sample observations. The post-crisis set includes observations from July 1997 to December 2001.
10 We still include the output variable in the final regression as the coefficient estimate is found to be significant. explaining fluctuations of the inflation rate in Indonesia at 5% and 1% significant level.
Indicating the robustness of the test results, each set of regressions (with bilateral nominal exchange rates of rupiah against the US dollar and yen, and the nominal effective exchange rate) arrives at the same overall conclusion.
During the post-1997 financial crisis, each of our monthly regression results robustly confirms the significant roles of expected depreciation of rupiah, money supply and domestic interest rate in explaining changes in the inflation rate in the country. In general, we find more significant lag variables of the key explanatory variables, namely the money supply and the expected depreciation during the post-crisis. Reflecting the rise in the number of significant lag variables, the R-squares for the post-crisis period are much larger than the pre-crisis period. The big gaps between the R-squares confirm the much more significant explanatory powers of the monetary model in explaining the inflationary pressures during the post-1997 crisis than during the pre-crisis period. We will analyze further the empirical results posted in Table 2 -4 in section four of the paper. But first, the next two sub-sections of the paper will quickly review two important diagnosis tests.
Testing the Implicit Assumption of Exogeneity
The validity of the econometrics test results posted in the previous tables crucially depends on the implicit assumption that the right-hand side variables in Equation (13) are statistically exogenous to inflation. To test for the statistical exogeneity, we employ the one-sided procedure to test for causality in the sense of Granger (1969) . This one-sided Granger causality test is chosen here from a number of alternative causality techniques in the light of the Monte Carlo evidence reported by Geweke, Meese, and Dent (1983) .
11
To be consistent with the ARDL tests, we also break the periods into pre-and post-crisis periods, and consider only the significant variables as posted in Table 2 -4.
Furthermore, since the Granger test is narrowly interpreted here as a test for statistical exogeneity of particular variables within a given model, it seemed more prudent to maintain the same lag specifications as in the early results shown in Table 2 -4 when applying the Granger test. 12 From the test results, we can conclude that the implicit assumption of exogeneity for the explanatory variables is generally found to be applicable in our cases, except for the post-crisis domestic interest rate. Table 5 ) ----
----(Insert
Stability Test
In addition to exogeneity test, we also conduct the commonly used Chow-stability test (Chow, 1960) 
Variance Decomposition
In addition to the ARDL models, we formulate the vector autoregressive models (VAR) to evaluate the variability in inflation rates by the means of key policy variables such as expected depreciations and the money supply. Variance decomposition 11 The same procedure was also employed by Darrat and Arize (1990) .
separates the variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks to the VAR. In each of the variance decomposition test, we only include the significant explanatory variables reported in each ARDL test. The objective here is to roughly estimate further the explanatory powers of the significant independent variables listed in Table 2 -4. The results are posted in Table 6a -6c.
----(Insert Table 6a-6c) ----
Several points are worth to be highlighted. The shares of the growth rates of the money supply and the expected depreciation of rupiah in explaining the variances in the domestic inflation are very modest during the pre-1997 crisis. The statistics show that at least 96 percent of the variances of the inflation can be explained by its own shocks.
These findings are indeed consistent with the low-R squares reported in Table 2 -4 on the pre-crisis regressions. Looking at Figure 3 , hardly any consistent patterns between inflation and the growth rates of base money and expected depreciations of rupiah can also be traced.
Despite the significant t-statistics for the pre-crisis quarterly regressions (Table 2- 4), the shares of the various estimates of the expected depreciation of rupiah (i.e. against the US dollar, the yen and the nominal effective exchange rate) are relatively small. Furthermore, the VAR test results suggest that shares of output variable are more significant than the monetary variables in explaining the inflation rate. However, given the inconsistent sign of the coefficient estimate for income (Table 2-4), these results are arguably inconclusive.
Consistent with the sharp rise in the R-squares of the ARDL tests, the combined variances of the monetary variables (growth of money, expected depreciation and the changes in the domestic interest rate) have contributed more than 50 percent of the variation in the domestic inflation rate during the post-1997 crisis. In each set, we can also conclude that the role of money supply is indeed by far the most significant one, contributing as much as 37 percent of the variation in the inflation rate. As for the exchange rate, we find the contribution to be around 9 to 11 percent. These findings are fully supported by close movements of rupiah, base money and inflation shown in Figure   4 . Unfortunately, given the lack of monthly data on the output variable, we cannot access the impact of the real GDP growth rates of the economy on the inflation during the post-1997 crisis.
Rupiah and Base Money
Preceding discussions have confirmed the important roles of base money and exchange rate movements in explaining inflation in Indonesia. However, the significance 
Rupiah
Drawing on the work of Frankel and Wei (1994) , McKinnon (2000 McKinnon ( , 2001 concluded that after a temporary adoption of a more flexible regime during the height of the crisis (July 1997 to December 1998), the Southeast Asian-5 economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore) had reverted to their pre-crisis US dollar soft pegged exchange rate policies since 1999. Lim (2002) extends the study to cover observations until November 2001 and confirms the McKinnon results
13
.
13 Hernandez and Montiel (2001) , who analyse the evidence regarding post-crisis exchange rate policies pursued in the Asia-5 economies, conclude as follows. contrary to the views of some observers…there has indeed been a change in de facto exchange rate regimes in all five of these countries between the pre-and post-crisis periods. While none of them have adopted "soft pegs" with unfettered capital movements, neither have they moved to the extreme corner solutions of To further examine the recent trends of rupiah during the pre-and post-crisis period, we employ different types of ARCH models to estimate the volatility rates of the currency. The GARCH specification that we consider takes the form: (LnNER) represents the nominal effective exchange rate and the bilateral nominal exchanges rate of rupiah against the US dollar and the Japanese yen in the log forms.
The conditional variance equation (Eq.14b) described above is a function of three terms:
(1) the mean α ; (2) 
Different types of ARCH models such as ARCH, GARCH and EGARCH models
were estimated on the data. However, the GARCH(1,1) model is found to be superior in generating the volatility for the nominal rupiah against US dollar and the nominal effective exchange rate. On the other hand, ARCH(1) model is found to be superior in generating the volatility for the nominal exchange rate against the Japanese yen. The GARCH(1,1) and ARCH(1) estimates are reported in Table 7 and Figure 5 .
"hard" pegs or clean floats. In other words, all of them have continued to manage their exchange rates in an active manner..and have thus occupied the supposed "hollow middle" of exchange rate policy (p.16).
---Insert Table 7 and Figure 5---
Few interesting points should be highlighted from the GARCH(1,1) and ARCH (1) results. Confirming the early findings of Hernandez and Montiel (2001) , McKinnon (2000) and Lim (2002) , we find the volatility of nominal rupiah against the US dollar to be very moderate during the pre-crisis. However, as in the case of Thailand baht ), the soft-US dollar pegged policy adopted during the pre-1997 crisis has allowed substantially more severe volatilities of the nominal effective exchange rate and the nominal rupiah exchange rate against the yen. In fact, the average conditional variances of rupiah against the yen and the nominal effective exchange rate were at least 20 percent and 100 percent higher than the prevailing rates against the US dollar during the period from January 1990 to December 1996, respectively ( Figure 5 ).
During the post-1997 crisis period, the GARCH(1,1) conditional variances of rupiah against the US dollar, the yen and the NEER have risen between 1400 percent to 2100 percent from the pre-crisis rates. More importantly, the average conditional variance for the nominal rupiah against the US dollar is found to be moderately higher than the average conditional variance for the nominal rupiah against the yen. Figure 5 also shows the fall in overall volatilities since 1999. The average conditional variances of the three different measures of rupiah nominal exchange rate during the post-1999 period are still however generally higher than the pre-1997 crisis period.
Furthermore, it is also relevant to note here that the coefficients for dummy in all three rupiah series are positive and significant, except for the NEER variable (Table 7) .
The positive coefficients confirm that the adoption of less rigid exchange rate policy allowed the rupiah to be more volatile against the world currencies, particularly at the height of political and financial crisis in 1998.
Based on those findings on the volatilities of rupiah during the pre-and post-1997 financial crisis and the empirical results posted in Table 2 -4, we can safely conclude that the adoption of a more flexible exchange rate during the crisis period has adverse implication on the inflation rate in Indonesia. Our findings on the rupiah exchange rate provide a supporting evidence for the "fear of floating" phenomena posted by Calvo and Reinhart (2000a and 2000b) . The two studies indicated that adverse consequences of exchange-rate volatilities on trade and inflation are found to be more damaging to the emerging market economies than developed economies. As a result, the developing economies (such as the East Asian countries) are more reluctant to tolerate large exchange rate movements ---by adopting a more flexible exchange rate policy and abandoning the soft-US dollar pegged policy.
Base Money
On November 1, 1997, the day after the first IMF agreement was signed, the government of Indonesia announced the liquidation of 16 banks. Although the decision had already been foreshadowed, it created shock waves that resulted in a total loss of confidence in the banking system (Soesastro and Basri (1998) ). One of the aftermaths of the closure of the banks was the rise in the levels of monetary aggregates during the last few months of 1997 and first seven months of 1998. The expansion reflected the liquidity support provided to troubled banks and the impact of depositor runs on banks. The consequence of the banking sector bailouts prompted an increasing use of seigniorage, and would eventually require infusions of liquidity to prevent systemic runs.
Within a month after the announcement of the closures of the 16 banks, the level of base money has grown by more than 36%. Figure 4 shows that by the end of July 1998, the base money had experienced an unprecedented increase of more than 115% from its level in November 1997. For the sake of comparison, between 1991 and 1996, the annual growth rate of base money in Indonesia had been averaging only around 25%, with the highest growth in 1996 at 38% and the lowest in 1991 at around 15%.
Consequently, as our test results suggest, the rapid expansion of base money played the most significant role in generating strong inflationary pressures during the post-crisis period.
Brief Concluding Remarks
In this study, we construct a simple and testable monetary model to uncover the source of inflation in Indonesia, particularly during the pre-and post-1997 financial crisis. Based on the working monetary model, our empirical results have shown that a significant rise in the expected depreciation of rupiah and a loose management of base money, particularly during the early stage of the 1997 financial crisis, have indeed been among the fundamental roots of the strong inflationary pressures in Indonesia during the recent years. In addition, we also find that the adoption of a more flexible exchange regime in August 1997 has allowed the rupiah to be more volatile and inflationary.
However, we find limited evidences on the roles of monetary variables in explaining the inflation rate during the pre-1997 period.
In its 2002 budget plan, the government of Indonesia has announced a target of an annual inflation rate of 8%. Our empirical results supports McLeod (2001) which argues implicitly that there is no reason why the target inflation rate cannot be met, provided the central bank sticks to the targeted growth rate of base money. As our empirics have shown, the success of the country to manage its inflation during the precrisis is largely due to its ability to keep the money supply growing at a respectable rate of around 25 percents. However, maintaining a conservative monetary policy stand when the financial institutions are effectively collapsed is a complex task for the government of Indonesia (Alamsyah et.al (2001) and Siregar (2001) ). It requires not only the commitment by the monetary authorities, but also the political will of both central and local provincial governments. Recent efforts by the country to push for a greater autonomy for the local governments, including in the managements of the budgets, have created concerns over the management of price stability at the provincial levels (SMERU 2001) . It is clear from the recent crisis however that failure to achieve price stability has been proven to be very costly for the economy in general. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and ***significant at 1% Note: a). Numbers inside ( ) are the t-statistics b). For the nominal exchange rate of rupiah against the US dollar, we find GARCH(1,1) model. c). For the nominal exchange rate of rupiah against the Japanese yen, we find ARCH(1). 
